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DIAL-A-PORN: A PRIVATE AFFAIR
I. INTRODUCTION
For years people have debated how to deal with their enigmatic in-
terest in sex. As Supreme Court Justice William Brennan wrote, "Sex, a
great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a
subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
vital problems of human interest and public concern."' Throughout his-
tory sex has been presented in many different forms, and humanity has
devised many methods to deal with these different presentations.2 For
example, in 1815 a Pennsylvania court decided that exhibiting a picture
of a nude couple for profit was a crime.3 Congress passed the first fed-
eral obscenity statute in 1842 which prohibited the importation of ob-
scene pictorial matter.4 However, no obscenity statute was strictly
enforced until 1873 when Congress made sending obscene material
through the mail a criminal offense.'
Today courts and legislatures have a more difficult job in attempting
to regulate obscenity. Over the years attitudes about what is obscene or
indecent have changed,6 as have the modes by which people gain access
to obscene and indecent material. 7  This evolution has created a prob-
lem: obscene and indecent material that could once be kept from an au-
dience of children now cannot be. There are two sides to the issue of
how to keep this material from children while making it accessible to
adults. On one side are those who aim "to protect the morals of society
from the taint of obscenity."8 On the other side are those who oppose
the suppression of even the most offensive speech for fear of a domino
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
2. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 904-08 (2d ed. 1988) for a
discussion of early obscenity cases.
3. Id. § 12-16 at 906 (citing Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815)).
4. 5 Stat. 566 (1842). This statute was an attempt to restrict the French postcard trade.
5. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 906.
6. See Gray, Exposure to Pornography and Aggression Toward Women: The Case of the Angry
Male, 29 Soc. PROBs. 387, 388 (1982).
7. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at 17, col. 1. Computer pornography, which provides access to
dirty jokes, pornographic pictures, and formats for trading sexual messages, is the newest form. This
form is so new that legal issues, such as whether it is protected by the first amendment, are yet to be
determined. Id.
8. M. ERNST & A. LINDEY, THE CENSOR MARCHES ON 218 (1971).
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effect.9
A mode of pornography which has recently emerged is telephone
pornography, commonly known as dial-a-porn.10 Dial-a-porn was popu-
larized in New York by Gloria Leonard, who published the messages,
and the New York Telephone Company, which provided the phone lines
on which the messages were carried." The "976" prefix for dial-a-porn
numbers" was originally established to provide a variety of pre-recorded
information services, such as sports scores and weather reports. 3 When
dial-a-porn was first introduced in 1983, it received nineteen million calls
in just one month. 4 Although the initial interest has faded, the New
York Telephone Company still reports five million calls a month to the
pornographic services. 5 Many of the "976" lines are operated by tiny
companies or individuals. 16 However, Carlin Communications, Inc., an
affiliate of High Society magazine, receives 500,000 calls each day in sev-
enteen cities, 7 making it the largest provider of dial-a-porn.
Since March 1983, dial-a-porn services have generated substantial
revenue for the providers of the messages as well as the telephone compa-
nies on whose lines the messages are carried.18 Hundreds of parents na-
tionwide have complained about the easy access to pornography these
9. Chemerinsky, Outlawing Pornography: What We Gain, What We Lose, HuM. RTs., Spring,
1985, at 48 ("[C]ould a censor prohibit broadcast of the old 'Leave it to Beaver' reruns because June
Cleaver's character is degrading to women? Could the television show 'The Jeffersons' be banned
because George Jefferson is degrading to blacks?").
10. Dial-a-porn can be either a sexually explicit pre-recorded message or a live message. The
customer pays for the pre-recorded messages with the regular monthly telephone bill. The live
message must be paid for in advance, with a credit card. Since children are not issued credit cards,
they presumptively do not have access to the live messages. Therefore, the live messages are not as
controversial and will not be an issue in this comment. See Comment, First Amendment Constraints
on the Regulation of Telephone Pornography, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 237 n.5 (1986).
11. The Voice with the Leer, FORBES, Mar. 26, 1984, at 12, 14.
12. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, at 26, col. 4. Telephone companies have been criticized for
catering to dial-a-porn providers by giving them special numbers at their request. Examples of these
numbers are 976-FOXX, 976-4SEX, and 97-NASTY. The telephone companies claim they issue
these numbers at the customers' request without screening them and were shocked at the words
used. Id.
13. Reidinger, Ring My Bell, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1987, at 108.
14. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, at 26, col. 4.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. As a result of California's technological ingenuity, dial-a-porn callers with Touch-Tone
telephones can choose from one of several scenarios by pressing the appropriate button, after listen-
ing to a brief description of the available scenes. Id.
18. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1986, at 25, col. 3 (pre-recorded messages can take 50,000 calls an
hour without giving a busy signal). See also Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Com-
mon Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,349 (1983) (codified at 47
C.F.R. ch. 1); The Voice with the Leer, supra note 11.
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services provide for their children.' 9 The dilemma is how to block chil-
dren's access effectively to dial-a-porn, while at the same time allowing
adults access to the services. Earlier this year Congress passed legislation
banning interstate dial-a-porn, but in the final analysis, the Supreme
Court may have to determine if dial-a-porn can be constitutionally regu-
lated. Dial-a-porn is, however, only one of many influences in our soci-
ety that may be harmful to children, as well as to adults. In order to
maintain a society which tolerates diverse interests, the Supreme Court
should give parents, rather than government, the primary responsibility
to censor those influences that may have a detrimental effect on their
children.
II. THE REGULATION OF OBSCENE AND INDECENT SPEECH
A. Early Attempts to Define Obscenity
In the 1868 case of Regina v. Hicklin,20 Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn developed a test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the
matter charged... is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this
sort may fall."'" Contemporary courts understood this test to mean that
they were to measure obscenity by its possible effect on the most suscepti-
ble and to judge the obscenity of the work by isolated passages.22
In 1933 a New York federal district court rejected the Hicklin stan-
dard in United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 2 3 when it deter-
mined that James Joyce's book Ulysses was not obscene. This ruling led
to the termination of the Hicklin standard in American jurisprudence.24
The court based the standard adopted in One Book Called "Ulysses" on
the effect the work would have on the average reader and on the domi-
nant theme of the work as a whole.25 This resulted in a much more leni-
ent standard than that in Hicklin. A work that may have been obscene
19. 134 CONG. REC. E1255 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (letter from the National P.T.A. to Reps.
Dingdell and Markey, supporting legislation to regulate dial-a-porn).
20. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), noted in L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 906 n.16.
21. Id. at 368, noted in L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 906 n.16.
22. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 907.
23. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), af'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
24. L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 907.
25. One Book Called "Ulysses" 5 F. Supp. at 185. Judge Woolsey stated:
It is only with the normal person that the law is concerned. Such a test as I have described,
therefore, is the only proper test of obscenity ....
I am quite aware that owing to some of its scenes "Ulysses" is a rather strong draught to ask
some sensitive, though normal, persons to take. But... whilst in many places the effect of "Ulysses"
on the reader undoubtedly is somewhat emetic, nowhere does it tend to be an aphrodisiac.
1988]
3
McKee: Dial-a-Porn: A Private Affair
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24:239
under the Hicklin test, because of the effect a single passage might have
on the most susceptible reader, would now be judged by the effect on the
average reader of the overall theme.
B. The Supreme Court Steps In
1. Roth v. United States
The test for obscenity evolved further in the 1957 Supreme Court
decision of Roth v. United States.26 This was the first case to present the
Supreme Court squarely with the obscenity question.27 Roth had been
convicted under 18 U.S.C. section 146128 for mailing obscene books, cir-
culars, and advertising.2 9 The Court held that obscenity is not constitu-
tionally protected speech.30 The obscenity test adopted by the Court in
Roth was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest."31 The Court also rejected the Hicklin test
because that test might prohibit material legitimately dealing with sex,
thus unconstitutionally restricting freedom of speech.32
In 1966 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, added another
element to the Roth test in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts.33 This element required the pros-
ecution to establish that "the material is utterly without redeeming social
value."' 34 This standard gave the prosecution the obligation of proving a
negative, a burden which is virtually impossible to meet in our criminal
justice system.35
Id. Judge Woolsey's main factor in determining obscenity was whether or not a work was written
with "pornographic intent," i.e., written for the purpose of exploiting obscenity. id. at 184.
26. 354 U.S. 476, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
27. Id. at 481.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1940) makes a crime of sending through the mail material that is "ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, or filthy... or other publication of an indecent character." Roth,
354 U.S. at 479 n.I.
29. Id. at 480.
30. Id. at 485.
31. Id. at 489. The Court pointed out that:
[S]ex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional pro-
tection of freedom of speech and press.
Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted).
32. Id. at 489.
33. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
34. Id. at 418.
35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979) (A negative averment is an allegation that is negative in form but
affirmative in substance, for which the party making the allegation has the burden of proof.).
4
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2. Miller v. California
In the 1973 case of Miller v. California,36 the Supreme Court formed
a majority in an obscenity case for the first time since Roth to agree on
guidelines to isolate obscenity from expression protected by the first
amendment.37 The Miller Court, agreeing with the Court in Roth, said
that the lewd and obscene "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. '3' The Court in Miller then attempted to make the
test for obscenity more concrete by laying out the basic guidelines for the
trier of fact:
(a) Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes in a pa-
tently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
39
In Miller, Chief Justice Burger recognized that the "utterly without re-
deeming social value" element added to the obscenity test in Memoirs
created an unworkable standard, which no member of the Court at the
time of Miller supported.' However, the Court in Miller seems to have
refined, not rejected, this element. Under the Miller formulation, the
prosecution must still prove a negative by affirmatively establishing that
the work lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.41
36. 413 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941) (emphasis
added by the Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852
(1957))).
39. Id. at 24 (citation omitted). The Court confined regulation of speech to works depicting or
describing sexual conduct. Sexual conduct is identified as "(a) Patently offensive representations or
descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the geni-
tals." Id. at 25. In order to be protected by the first amendment, a "depiction or description of
sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 26. See gener-
ally Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, reh'g denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (upholding the Miller
test as constitutionally permissible); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (using the Miller test to
determine that the movie Carnal Knowledge is not obscene); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973) (using Miller standard to conclude that obscene material
shown to consenting adults is not constitutionally protected); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115,
rehg denied, 414 U.S. 883 (1973) (stresses special difficulty of keeping printed material from being
distributed to children); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (allowing Congress to forbid
interstate transportation of obscenity for private transporter's use).
40. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
41. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 98 (Brennan, J., dissenting), reh'g denied,
414 U.S. 881 (1973) where Justice Brennan states:
1988]
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In regard to the Miller test, Chief Justice Burger explained that the
vague term "community standards" did not create a national standard
for obscenity.4" The inherent diversity of the different states caused the
Court to conclude that reading the first amendment as requiring people
in one region of the country to accept conduct found acceptable by peo-
ple in another region would not be constitutionally sound.43
However, in Pope v. Illinois,' the Court determined that the third
element of the Miller test would not be governed by a community stan-
dard, writing that "[t]he proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary mem-
ber of any given community would find serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable
person would find such value in the material, taken as a whole."4 Thus,
the Court shifted from a community standard to a reasonable person
standard for this element of the Miller test. The Court also explained that
the reasonable person standard could still be met if only a minority of the
population believes a work has serious value.46
3. "Obscenity" - An Unreliable Standard
The obscenity standard has a history of instability. This is clearly
manifested by the transformation of Justice Brennan's reasoning con-
cerning obscenity. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court in
Roth, which held that obscenity is not constitutionally protected
speech,47 but he dissented in Miller, where the Court reaffirmed this
view.48 Justice Brennan explained this change in his dissent in Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton4 9 by stating, "I am convinced that the approach
initiated 16 years ago in Roth ... cannot bring stability to this area of the
law without jeopardizing fundamental First Amendment values, and I
have concluded that the time has come to make a significant departure
One should hardly need to point out that under the third component of the Court's test the
prosecution is still required to "prove a negative" - Le., that the material lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Whether it will be easier to prove that mate-
rial lacks "serious" value than to prove that it lacks any value at all remains.., to be seen.
Id.
42. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973) ("[O]ur Nation is
simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be
articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation.. . ."). Id. at 30.
43. Id. at 32.
44. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
45. Id. at 1921 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 1921 n.3.
47. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957).
48. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
49. 413 U.S. 49, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
[Vol. 24:239
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from that approach."50 Justice Brennan noted that the Court, through-
out the years, has failed to create a standard that draws a distinct line
between protected and unprotected speech,51 and therefore, in his view,
the unconditional abolition of obscene speech could not be reconciled
with the underlying principles of the first amendment. 2
The hazy guidelines of the obscenity standard have left members of
the Court unsure about how to apply these guidelines to specific in-
stances of alleged obscenity. In order to guard against the suppression of
speech which deals legitimately with sex, the Court should refrain from
outlawing speech in the name of obscenity until clear guidelines deter-
mining what is obscene are established. Consequently, the Court should
not outlaw dial-a-porn on the basis of obscenity.
C. Indecency
The first amendment does not protect obscene speech, but it does
protect indecent speech.53 However, indecent speech may be regulated
by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.54 Indecent speech
has been defined as "language that describes, in terms patently offensive
as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience."5 5
In order to determine that a communication is indecent, a court must
consider the content of the communication and the time, place, and man-
ner in which it is used.
50. Id. at 73-74 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan felt that since no one can say for certain
what is obscene until at least five members of the Supreme Court, applying obscure standards, say it
is obscene, conviction under an obscenity statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 92. The only way to
be certain about what is obscene is "by drawing a line that resolves all doubt in favor of state power
and against the guarantees of the First Amendment." However, this would lead to overbroad stan-
dards permitting the suppression of a wide array of literary, scientific, and artistic masterpieces. No
free society could possibly tolerate such suppression. Id. at 94.
51. Id. at 83.
52. Id. See also L. TRIB , supra note 2, § 12-16, at 913 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 505 (1985)) ("State and local anti-obscenity statutes cannot, however, go so far as
to characterize as obscene that which provokes only 'normal and healthy sexual desires.' "). In the
evolution of the obscenity standard, the Court has "moved from a view in which the obscene was
unprotected because utterly worthless (Roth), to an approach in which the obscene was unprotected
if utterly worthless (Memoirs), to a conclusion in which obscenity was unprotected even if not 'ut-
terly' without worth (Miller)." Id. at 909 (original emphasis).
53. FCC launches attack on indecency, 112 BROADCASTING, Apr. 20, 1987, at 35.
54. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
55. Id. at 732 (citing 56 F.C.C. 2d at 98). "[Ihe commission suggested, if an offensive broad-
cast had literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and were preceded by warnings, it might not
be indecent in the late evening, but would be so during the day, when children are in the audience."
Id. at n.5.
1988]
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In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,6 Pacifica made an afternoon broad-
cast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue in which Carlin dis-
cussed "words you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves .... ", A
father driving with his young son heard the monologue and complained
to the Federal Communications Commission. 8 The FCC charged that
Pacifica had violated 18 U.S.C. section 1464, which prohibits the use of
any obscene, indecent, or profane language over the radio. Pacifica
Foundation claimed that the broadcast was not indecent because there
was a lack of prurient appeal. 9 Prurient appeal is an element of the
obscene, but indecency refers to a deviation from established moral stan-
dards.' ° The Court therefore rejected Pacifica's contention on the
grounds that prurient appeal is not an essential component of indecent
language. 61 As a result, the Court held that the FCC could regulate in-
decency for time, place, and manner on a nuisance basis.62
By concluding that indecent speech can be regulated, the Court con-
sidered "[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast
material" 63 and the "uniquely pervasive presence" the broadcast media
occupy in the lives of Americans."4 Accordingly, the Pacifica decision
does not apply to the regulation of indecent dial-a-porn messages. 65 Pri-
vate telephone calls are substantially different from the public broadcast
in Pacifica.66 Indecent speech is permissible over telephone lines because
existing technology enables parents to prevent their children's access to
56. 438 U.S. 726, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
57. Id. at 729. See id. at 751 for a verbatim transcript of the "Filthy Words" monologue.
58. Id. at 730.
59. Id. at 739-40. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, rehg denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974),
the Court held that although 18 U.S.C. § 1461 prohibits mailing "indecent" material, this prohibi-
tion actually applies only to the mailing of "obscene" materials. Consequently, Pacifica Foundation,
relying on Hamling, claimed that the prohibition against "indecent" speech in 18 U.S.C. § 1464
should also be construed to mean only "obscene" speech. However, because § 1461 applies to mail
and § 1464 applies to broadcasts, the Court in Pacifica determined that, as applied to broadcasts,
indecent speech is a violation of the statute. The Court explained that "[lit is unrealistic to assume
that Congress intended to impose precisely the same limitations on the dissemination of patently
offensive matter by such different means." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
60. Id. at 740.
61. Id. at 741.
62. Id. at 750. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 557 n.1 (1981) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("because of the limited spectrum available and the peculiar intrusiveness of the medium,
broadcasting is subject to limitations that would be intolerable if applied to other forms of communi-
cation" (citation omitted)). Id.
63. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
64. Id. at 748.
65. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 560 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 56
U.S.L.W. 2433 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1988) (No. 87-4054),petition for cert. filed, July 5, 1988 [hereinafter
Carlin III].
66. Id.
8
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this presentation of objectionable speech.67
III. THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN: A COMPELLING
GOVERNMENT INTEREST
A. Judicial Treatment of Children
In 1976 Justice Blackmun wrote in Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth 61 that "[m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitu-
tion and possess constitutional rights., 69  However, children's rights
under the Constitution are not equal to the rights of adults.7 ° The Court
in Bellotti v. Baird7' recognized three reasons justifying this conclusion:
(1) children's vulnerability; (2) children's inability to make informed,
mature decisions; and (3) the important role parents play in guiding their
children through adolescence. 72
As a result of this rationale, minors have consistently been denied
access to material that adults have been held to have the right to pos-
sess.73 In Ginsberg v. New York 74 the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a New York statute75 prohibiting the sale of "girlie magazines" to
67. Id.
68. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
69. Id. at 74. See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding that the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment applies to juveniles, as well as to adults); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975) (holding that juveniles are entitled to at least minimal due process before being expelled from
school); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that
minor school students are protected by the free speech clause of the first amendment and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment as long as they do not substantially interfere with
"school discipline or the rights of others"); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process applies to proceedings in which juveniles are charged as delinquents
for crimes which might lead to incarceration). See generally Note, Children's Rights Under the
Burger Court: Concern for the Child But Deference to Authority, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1214
(1985) (analyzing the constitutional rights of children under the Burger Court); Stem, The Burger
Court and the Diminishing Constitutional Rights of Minors: A Brief Overview, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
865 (1985) (analysis of the lessening of minors' autonomy under the Burger Court).
70. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979) (holding that a Mas-
sachusetts statute which requires parental consent before an abortion can be performed on an un-
married woman under the age of 18 is unconstitutional).
71. 443 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
72. Id. at 634.
73. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. See generally R. REIMER, REGULATIONS OF
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS [Dial-A-Porn]: A LEGAL ANAL-
Ysis, Cong. Res. Serv. (Dec. 24, 1986) (history and legal discussion of laws regulating dial-a-porn as
of 1986).
74. 390 U.S. 629, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968).
75. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(2) (McKinney 1965) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell.., to a minor:
(a) any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar vis-
ual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity,
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors, or (b) any book,
9
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anyone under the age of seventeen. The Court noted that the govern-
ment has an interest in seeing that children do not come into contact
with material which is unacceptable for them to view. Consequently, the
government can exercise its authority to safeguard the morals of society
by preventing the availability of books, deemed suitable for adults, to
children.76
In M.S. News Co. v. Casado" the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit upheld as constitutional a Wichita, Kansas ordi-
nance," which made unlawful the promotion of sexually-oriented mater-
ials to minors. The ordinance provided that materials were not
unlawfully "displayed" if they were behind "blinder racks." In Upper
Midwest Booksellers Association v. City of Minneapolis,79 the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a Minneapolis ordi-
nance, which prohibited any person from knowingly displaying, for
commercial purposes, material that was harmful to minors. This ordi-
nance provided that materials were not unlawfully displayed if they were
in sealed wrappers, behind opaque covers, or in "adults only" sections.80
pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which con-
tains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) of subdivision two hereof, or explicit and
detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or
sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 647.
76. Id. at 636 (citing Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952,
218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (1966)).
77. 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983).
78. WICHITA, KAN., CrrY CODE § 5.68.156 (2) (1979) states:
(2) Offenses. No person having custody, control or supervision of any commercial estab-
lishment shall knowingly:
(a) display material which is harmful to minors in such a way that minors, as a part
of the invited general public, will be exposed to view such material provided, however, a
person shall be deemed not to have "displayed" material harmful to minors if the material
is kept behind devices commonly known as "blinder racks" so that the lower two-thirds of
the material is not exposed to view.
M.S. News Co., 721 F.2d at 1296-97.
79. 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985).
80. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 15, § 385.131(6) (1984) states:
It is unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to exhibit, display, sell, offer to
sell, give away, circulate, distribute, or attempt to distribute any material which is harmful
to minors in its content in any place where minors are or may be present or allowed to be
present and where minors are able to view such material unless each item of such material
is at all times kept in a sealed wrapper.
(a) It is also unlawful for any person commercially and knowingly to exhibit, dis-
play, sell, offer to sell, give away, circulate, distribute, or attempt to distribute any material
whose cover, covers, or packaging, standing alone, is harmful to minors, in any place where
minors are or may be present or allowed to be present and where minors are able to view
such material unless each item of such material is blocked from view by an opaque cover.
(b) The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to distribution or attempt to
distribute the exhibition, display, sale, offer of sale, circulation, giving away of material
harmful to minors where such material is sold, exhibited, displayed, offered for sale, given
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Each of the foregoing courts recognized that reasonable regulations
of speech normally protected under the first amendment are those which
restrain minors' access to adult material, while allowing adults' access to
this same material. These regulations promote the significant govern-
ment interest of protecting children from adult material, without denying
first amendment rights to adults or vendors of adult material. 8 How-
ever, in American Booksellers Association v. Commonwealth 82 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an amendment to a Virginia law,
which prohibited the knowing display of sexually explicit materials in a
way that made them openly available to minors.83 This amendment was
nullified on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally overbroad,84 since
it could be loosely interpreted to deny guaranteed free speech rights."
Unlike the statutes in M.S. News Co. and Upper Midwest Booksellers As-
sociation, the amendment questioned in American Booksellers Association
made no provision for a vendor to comply with the statute by making
adult material inaccessible to minors.
away, circulated, distributed, or attempted to be distributed under circumstances where
minors are not present, not allowed to be present, or are not able to view such material or
the cover, covers, or packaging of such material. Any business may comply with the re-
quirements of this clause by physically segregating such material in a manner so as to
physically prohibit the access to and view of the material by minors, by prominently post-
ing at the entrance(s) to such restricted area, "Adults Only-you must be 18 to enter," and
by enforcing said restrictions.
Upper Midwest Booksellers, 780 F.2d at 1407-08.
81. See id. at 1394-95; M.S. News Co., 721 F.2d at 1288.
82. 802 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1986).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1985) (as amended) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to sell or loan to a juvenile, or to knowingly
display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles may examine and peruse:
(1) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar vis-
ual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts sexu-
ally explicit nudity, sexual conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which is harmful to
juveniles, or
(2) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced or sound
recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (1) of this subsection, or
explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual
conduct or sadomasochistic abuse and which taken as a whole, is harmful to juveniles.
(Emphasis supplied to show language added by the 1985 amendment.).
American Booksellers, 802 F.2d at 693 n.2.
84. Id. at 695. The court in American Booksellers disagreed with the rulings in M.S. News and
Upper Midwest Booksellers. Judge Sprouse argued that adults' first amendment rights cannot be
overly burdened by restrictive obscenity standards which apply to juveniles. Id. at 696.
85. Cleary, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constraints On Shielding Children From
Dial-A-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 530 (1985). See also Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 844 (1970) ("Most laws affecting expressive activity com-
prehend at least some unconstitutional applications.").
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B. Implications for Dial-a-Porn
The judicial trend, regarding the restriction of non-obscene materi-
als that are harmful to minors, seems to allow restrictions which effec-
tively separate the child and adult audiences and invalidate restrictions
which group children and adults together. In Butler v. Michigan 86 the
Supreme Court held a Michigan statute87 unconstitutional because it
criminalized making available books "found to have a potentially delete-
rious influence on youth."88 The Court determined that this law was
unconstitutionally overbroad since it denied adults their free speech
rights by allowing them to read only what was acceptable for children.89
The Court contended that this law was "not reasonably restricted to the
evil with which it was to deal"9 and that the law "burn[t] the house to
roast the pig."91
These cases demonstrate that the courts will subject any attempt to
regulate speech to strict scrutiny, demanding that the least restrictive
means be used to further a compelling government interest. The Court
has recognized that protecting youth is a compelling government inter-
est;92 however, this interest cannot be furthered at the expense of denying
adults material that they have a first amendment right to possess. 93 Ac-
cordingly, dial-a-porn can be regulated to further the compelling govern-
ment interest of protecting youth insofar as that regulation does not
unconditionally deny adults' access to the services.
86. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
87. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 343 states:
Any person who shall import, print, publish, sell, possess with the intent to sell, design,
prepare, loan, give away, distribute or offer for sale, any book, magazine, newspaper, writ-
ing, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, drawing, photograph, publication or
other thing, including any recordings, containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious lan-
guage, or obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious prints, pictures, figures or descriptions,
tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the
corruption of the morals of youth, or shall. introduce into any family, school or place of
education or shall buy, procure, receive or have in his possession, any such book, pam-
phlet, magazine, newspaper, writing, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, drawing, photo-
graph, publication or other thing, either for the purpose of sale, exhibition, loan or
circulation, or with intent to introduce the same into any family, school or place of educa-
tion, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Butler, 352 U.S. at 381.
88. Id. at 382-83.
89. Id. at 383.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968).
93. See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
[Vol. 24:239
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IV. ATrEMPTS TO REGULATE DIAL-A-PORN
When dial-a-porn emerged in 1983, the existing legislation that
could have been used to regulate it was section 223 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934. 9' This law prohibited the making of any "comment,
request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
or indecent"" over the telephone. However, prosecutors did not enforce
this law with regard to dial-a-porn because they believed the section ap-
plied only to persons who spoke obscenely during calls that they had
placed. 96
Because dial-a-porn was not covered by any regulation, Congress
amended section 223 in 1983, making it a crime for commercial enter-
prises to provide indecent or obscene communications to adults without
their consent or to minors.97 Under this legislation, Congress charged
the Federal Communications Commission with setting regulations which
would effectively deny dial-a-porn access to persons under the age of
eighteen. Compliance with these regulations would serve as a defense to
prosecution for dial-a-porn providers.9"
94. 134 CONG. REC. El 110 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. 11 1984) states:
Whoever-
(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication by means of
telephone-
(A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
(B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing
his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the
called number;
(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring,
with intent to harass any person at the called number; or
(D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to har-
ass any person at the called number; or
(2) knowingly permits any telephone facility under his control to be used for any purpose
prohibited by this section,
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id
96. 134 CONG. REC. El 111 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. 11 1984) states:
(1) Whoever knowingly -
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by means
of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or indecent commu-
nication for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age or to any
other person without that person's consent, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for an ac-
tivity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id.
98. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1984) states:
It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the defendant restricted access to
1988]
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A. FCC Regulations and the Second Circuit's Response
1. Carlin I
On September 16, 1983, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry99 invit-
ing public comment on the method the Commission should use to regu-
late dial-a-porn. In the resulting Report and Order, adopted June 4,
1984, the FCC issued its first dial-a-porn regulation which allowed the
service to operate only between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. Eastern
time or require the caller to pay by credit card before hearing the
message." In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (Carlin 1)101 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the Com-
mission's regulations 02 because the Commission had failed to demon-
strate that limiting the operational hours of dial-a-porn effectively
restricted minors' access to the sexually explicit transmissions without
infringing upon the first amendment rights of adults to hear the
messages. 10 3
2. Carlin 11
On March 15, 1985, the FCC responded to the decision in Carlin I
by issuing a Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 1° to solicit addi-
tional suggestions on how to regulate dial-a-porn. On October 10, 1985
the Commission adopted its Second Report and Order which regulated
dial-a-porn services by requiring an authorized access or identification
code or payment by credit card before transmission of the message be-
gan.105 The access code could be received through the mail after the
dial-a-porn provider had reasonably concluded, by reviewing a written
application, that the applicant was not under eighteen years of age. 0 6
the prohibited communication to persons eighteen years of age or older in accordance with
procedures which the Commission shall prescribe by regulation.
Id.
99. 48 Fed. Reg. 43,348 (1983) (codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. 1).
100. 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (1984) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
101. 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Carlin 1].
102. See 48 Fed. Reg., supra note 99.
103. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 121 (stating that the regulation is both underinclusive and overinclu.
sive because it "denies access to adults between certain hours, but not to youths who can easily pick
up a private or public telephone and call dial-a-porn during the remaining hours"). Id.
104. 50 Fed. Reg. 10,510 (1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64) (This Second Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking specifically sought comments regarding technical means to restrict minors' access to
dial-a-porn services.).
105. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,704-06 (1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
106. Id. at 42,705.
[Vol. 24:239
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss2/4
DIAL-A-PORN
The code could be cancelled if lost, stolen, or used by minors.' 7 In Car-
lin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (Carlin 11)108 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals again invalidated the Commission's regulations on the ground
that the New York Telephone Company system could not technologi-
cally relay the caller's access code to the dial-a-porn message provider. 109
The court also found that the Commission had not adequately investi-
gated the possiblity of using less restrictive means to limit minors'
access. 110
3. Carlin II
In response to Carlin II, the Commission released its Third Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking on July 18, 1986.111 In the resulting Report
and Order, adopted April 16, 1987, the Commission reestablished access
codes and the use of credit cards and identified scrambling as another
acceptable method of restricting minors' access to dial-a-porn. 112
In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (Carlin 111)113 the Second
Circuit held that the Commission's third attempt to regulate dial-a-porn
was constitutionally permissible. These regulations survived strict scru-
tiny when the court concluded that the Commission had furthered a
compelling government interest by using the least restrictive means.1 14
In allowing access codes to be one of these means, the court found it
lawful that dial-a-porn providers would incur one-time charges of up to
$73,000 and monthly recurring charges of up to $12,000.115 The court
obviously accepted the Commission's assertion that the burden that these
costs imposed on dial-a-porn providers was reasonable in light of the in-
come generated by the pornographic services.116
In order to implement this method, an adult seeking access to dial-a-
porn would be required to fill out an application form to obtain an access
107. Id.
108. 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Carlin I1].
109. Id. at 855. The court was not convinced that the use of access codes was the least restric-
tive means to comply with Congress' mandate. Id.
110. Id.
111. 51 Fed. Reg. 26,915 (1986) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
112. 52 Fed. Reg. 17,760 (1987) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
113. 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 56 U.S.L.W. 2433 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 1988) (No. 87-
4054), petition for cert. filed, July 5, 1988.
114. Id. at 556.
115. Id. at 555-56.
116. Id. at 556.
1988]
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code." 7 After reasonably determining that the application was legiti-
mate, the provider would issue the access code. 1 8 Under this method
dial-a-porn calls would be sent from the telephone company's office to
the provider's office, where the access code would be verified and the
message transmitted immediately to the caller. 119
In establishing scrambling as an acceptable method for regulating
dial-a-porn, the Commission reversed an earlier decision which rejected
this method. 120  The court allowed this reversal on the basis that the
Commission had provided reasoned analysis justifying the change.' 2 '
Under this process, the message would be scrambled so that it would be
unintelligible without the use of a descrambler available only to adult
callers. 122
The Commission had originally rejected scrambling because it be-
lieved descramblers would have to be installed at the customer's prem-
ises. 123  It initially determined that this method would create an
impermissible burden on customers and deny adult callers access to the
messages from any telephone not equipped with a descrambler. 124 How-
ever, AT&T described a battery-operated descrambler which requires no
installation and is simply held against the receiver's earpiece. 125 The
Commission concluded that this device rendered scrambling acceptable,
since it would permit access by adults from virtually any telephone and
would not create an impermissible hardship on dial-a-porn providers. 126
The court also found the estimated cost of fifteen dollars for a portable
descrambler to be an acceptable price. 1 27
B. Congress' Ban of Dial-A-Porn
On April 19, 1988 Congress, unsatisfied with the Second Circuit's
validation of the Commission's regulations of dial-a-porn, approved a to-
tal ban of dial-a-porn, making it illegal for adults, as well as children, to
117. Id. at 554.
118. Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,704-05 (1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt, 64).
119. Carlin II, 837 F.2d 546, 550 (2d. Cir. 1988), modified, 56 U.S.L.W. 2433 (2d Cir. Jan. 15,
1988) (No. 87-4054), petition for cert. filed, July 5, 1988.
120. Id. at 556.
121. Id.
122. Third Report and Order, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,761 (1987) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
123. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 556.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
[Vol. 24:239
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have access to the sexually explicit messages. 28 Congress accomplished
this by amending section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934, strik-
ing out the words "under eighteen years of age or to any other person
without that person's consent." 129 This legislation now makes it a crime
to make "any obscene or indecent communication for commercial pur-
poses to any person."1 30  On April 28, 1988, President Reagan signed
the bill into law,13' outlawing dial-a-porn. However, because the legisla-
tion suppresses speech, serious first amendment questions are likely to be
raised. 132
1. Clear and Present Danger
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech." 133 In 1972, Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 134 stated that if
the first amendment means anything it "means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."135 However, in 1919, Justice Holmes had asserted
128. Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
129. H.R. 4401, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (passed as a rider to the Elementary and Secondary
Education Improvement Act).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1) now states:
Whoever knowingly-
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by means
of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or indecent communica-
tion for commercial purposes to any person regardless of whether the maker of such com-
munication placed the call; or
(3) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for an ac-
tivity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
134 CONG. REc. H1707 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frost).
131. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1988, at 13, col. 1. The Telephone Decency Act of 1988 is only
applicable to interstate dial-a-porn, while the bulk of dial-a-porn messages is transmitted within state
lines. Id.
132. See 134 CONG. REC. H1696-97 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (Diane S. Killroy, General Coun-
sel, advised Congress that a blanket prohibition of dial-a-porn may be determined to be unconstitu-
tional since it includes indecent speech. Ms. Killroy also advised Congress to limit its prohibition to
areas in which dial-a-porn could not be technologically regulated.). See generally Cleary, supra note
85 (analysis of the free speech rights of children and of adults and the limits of such rights in relation
to obscene or indecent communication); R. REIMER, supra note 73; Comment, Telephones, Sex, And
The First Amendment, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1221 (1986) (discussion of the constitutionality of regulat-
ing dial-a-porn). Suit has been filed in New York federal district court opposing the congressional
ban. The plaintiffs requested an injunction from enforcement of the legislation, and the court
granted an injunction against "indecent" dial-a-porn messages but denied an injunction against "ob-
scene" dial-a-porn transmissions. Jane Roe, John Doe, Inc. v. Meese, No. 88-4420 (S.D.N.Y. July
22, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
134. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
135. Id. at 95.
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in Schenck v. United States136 that "[t]he question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 137 As evi-
denced by its recent legislative action, Congress apparently believes that
dial-a-porn creates a "clear and present danger" that the services will
"bring about substantive evils" which it has a right to prevent. Congress
has therefore restricted the first amendment guarantee of free speech in
order to prevent minors from having access to materials which may have
a "potentially deleterious influence" on them.13
Dial-a-porn appears to have a deleterious effect on some minors.
Parents whose children have either called the service and then sexually
molested another child, or whose children have been sexually molested
by a child who has listened to dial-a-porn, have filed lawsuits against
dial-a-porn providers. 139  In one such case five minor males and one
minor female called dial-a-porn while there were no adults in the house.
Within forty-eight hours, two of the males had sexually molested the fe-
male, who encouraged them by asking them to touch her and "Do it with
her" - phrases she allegedly heard on dial-a-porn. 14 Later in the same
day another of the males had sexual intercourse with a girl because "it
136. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
137. Id. at 52.
138. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
139. 134 CONG. REc. El 11l (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988). A letter to a member of Congress states:
"Dial-A-Porn" has deeply affected my family and friends .... My 13-year-old son, Kevin,
called the 900 number. Kevin's friend Don, 15, was over and they were listening to the
prerecorded messages. Later when I arrived home from work I immediately made them
hang up. Unknown to me, Kevin's 14-year-old brother was listening on another line with
his two friends. They continued to listen passing it back and forth. Their sister Jacqueline,
10, was also listening on her extension.
Within 48 hours Don and his 11-year-old brother molested my daughter Jacqueline.
The Clio Vienna Township Police were notified and in their investigation revealed the fact
that Jacqueline had encouraged them by asking them to touch her and "Do it with her" -
phrases she heard on the "Dial-a-porn." Later the same day I learned that Kevin had
sexual intercourse with a girl. His response when asked why was "it sounded like fun." I
asked him, "What sounded like fun?" and he said "You know the phone call, the $74
phone call."
This phone call has damaged our lives. It has caused strain and distrust in our family.
We have had conflict with our neighbors when we had to inform them of their children's
involvement. Most of all it has done permanent damage to our daughter. Somehow the
proper steps must be taken to eliminate this diseased pornography that is so readily avail-
able to children .... Please help our children to prevent such occurrence again.
Id.
140. Id.
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sounded like fun" on dial-a-porn.14' From this account dial-a-porn ap-
parently may be a "deleterious" influence on youth and may present a
"clear and present danger" to the morals of youth.
2. Implications for Other Types of Communication
Other modes of communication also appear to present a "potentially
deleterious influence" on youth, as well as on society as a whole, by en-
couraging criminal or anti-social behavior.142 For example, after watch-
ing the movie Tarantulas: The Deadly Cargo, a fourteen-year-old girl
went to a pet shop, bought a tarantula, and placed it in her parents' bed.
The girl's parents later told authorities that she had threatened them
before watching the movie.'43 Another incident occurred after the movie
Fuzz had been shown on television in Boston. In one scene in the movie a
person was doused with gasoline and set on fire. Two days later several
youths, imitating the movie, set fire to a woman." In yet another inci-
dent, the movie Doomsday Flight, which dealt with extortion of an air-
line, was shown on television in Australia. An extortion attempt was
later made on Quantas Airlines using the exact method depicted in the
film."' These instances show that television and movies, to which chil-
dren constantly have unsupervised access, have a "deleterious" effect on
the behavior of minors, as well as adults.
If Congress makes certain types of communication illegal because of
the harmful effect that a particular communication has on society, then
dial-a-porn is not the only form of communication that Congress has the
obligation to regulate. A comment made by Justice Douglas in his dis-
sent in Miller v. California'46 has relevance regarding dial-a-porn. He
said, "the materials before us may be garbage ... [b]ut so is much of
what is said in political campaigns, in the daily press, on TV, or over the
radio."147 There are many harmful influences with which children are in
constant contact: violence on television, in movies, in books and
magazines, and advertisements that suggest that harmful substances such
as alcohol and tobacco are glamorous. However, Congress allows parents
141. Id.
142. See generally Spak, Predictable Harm: Should The Media Be Liable?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 671
(1981) (discussing the proposition that television and movie producers should be liable for violence
and other harm that they should reasonably be able to predict will result from their productions).
143. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 21, 1980, at 48, col. 1.
144. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1973, at 1, col. 2.
145. N.Y. Times, May 27, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
146. 413 U.S. 15 (Douglas, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
147. Id. at 45.
1988]
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to choose how to raise their children while they are surrounded by these
influences.
C. Right to Disconnect
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that because telephone companies are privately owned
utilities, they can deny phone lines to dial-a-porn providers without vio-
lating the providers' first amendment rights. 148 The courts said that a
telephone company could decide for business reasons not to transmit
dial-a-porn messages without engaging in "public censorship," as long as
state action is not the cause of the telephone company's conduct. 149In
Blum v. Yaretsky 150 the Supreme Court stated that "a State normally can
be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coer-
cive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt
or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the
State." 15' Telephone companies can thus deny phone lines to dial-a-porn
providers, as long as this action is not the result of a state law which
penalizes the telephone company for the content of the messages carried
over its lines. 152
D. Alternative Methods for Dealing with Dial-A-Porn
1. Constitutional Amendment
In his dissent in Miller v. California153 Justice Douglas suggested
that any attempt at censorship should be done "by constitutional amend-
ment after full debate by the people."' 54 Presently there are no guidelines
set forth in the Constitution for determining what is "obscene" and what
is not. Therefore, the Supreme Court is able to determine what speech
may be censored, even though the first amendment states in absolute
terms that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech .... ,' The Constitution is what the people of the United States
look to in determining what action they may take. If it is to be enforced
148. See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352 (1lth Cir. 1986).
149. Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1297; Southern Bell, 802 F.2d at 1357.
150. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
151. Id. at 1004.
152. Southern Bell, 802 F.2d at 1361.
153. 413 U.S. 15 (Douglas, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
154. Id. at 41.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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in a way that differs from its actual content, then, perhaps Justice Doug-
las was right when he said the document itself needs to be changed by the
people.
Nonetheless, this method would be burdensome for the government
as well as the people. There have been only twenty-six constitutional
amendments in more than two hundred years, only eleven in this cen-
tury, and none since 1971.156 The relatively small number of amend-
ments, as compared to the amount of legislation, suggests that the task is
an arduous one. Also, since Schenck in 1919 the Court has continually
allowed laws which restrict the first amendment's guarantee to freedom
of speech. 15 7 This action by the Court suggests that the absolute wording
of the first amendment is actually not absolute. The reason for this is
that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution158 and can
therefore "amend" the Constitution by judicial interpretation.
2. Other Technical Methods
Technological means, other than scrambling and the use of access
codes and credit cards, have also been suggested to regulate dial-a-porn.
One such method would be the use of a customer premises "blocking"
device by which access to one or more preselected telephone numbers
can be prevented.1 59 This method would allow parents to deny dial-a-
porn access in their home by programming the device to "block" dial-a-
porn numbers when dialed."6  However, the FCC rejected blocking
since, by tampering with this device, children could easily make this
method ineffective. 61
156. See R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxvi-lxxviii (2d ed. 1985). The fram-
ers of the Constitution have purposely made it difficult to put through an amendment. A stringent
two-thirds majority vote by Congress is required to propose a Constitutional amendment, and that
proposed amendment must be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. U.S. CONST.
art. V.
157. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding defendant's conviction for making
an inflammatory speech to a racially mixed crowd on a city street despite the defendant's claim that
the conviction violated his first amendment right to free speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (upholding, as constitutional, a New Hampshire statute, which stated: "No
person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in
any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise
or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent
him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation."); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (upholding, as constitutional, the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 which prohibited the mail-
ing of printed circulars with intent to influence men to avoid the draft).
158. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
159. Second Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,510, 10,512 (1985) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
160. Carlin III, 837 F.2d 546, 554 (2d Cir. 1988), modified, 56 U.S.L.W. 2433 (2d Cir. Jan. 15,
1988) (No. 87-4054), petition for cert. filed, July 5, 1988.
161. Id.
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Another method of limiting access to dial-a-porn is the screening of
calls from particular numbers to particular numbers. 62 As with block-
ing, a screening system would allow parents to regulate whether dial-a-
porn is accessible from their home. However, because implementation
would be costly, screening is not economically feasible. 163
The regulations set forth by the Commission in its Third Report and
Order are technologically and economically feasible and constitutionally
sound. The regulations allow adults access to dial-a-porn, while provid-
ing the means for children to be shielded from the messages. This ac-
commodation gives deference to parents by allowing them to determine
what influences their children will be subjected to in their own homes.
V. CONCLUSION
In a diverse society where freedom of speech is among the most
highly valued of liberties, there will necessarily be types of communica-
tion which some segment of the population will oppose. However, just as
people are free to speak as they like, people are also individually allowed
to avoid those influences that they do not want to hear or see. Because
many influences in our society are potentially harmful to minors, parents
have always been responsible for determining which of those influences
they believe will harm minor children. This allows adults the constitu-
tional protection to which they are entitled, while protecting children
from the potentially harmful influences of a free society.
Sean H. McKee
162. See 50 Fed. Reg., supra note 159.
163. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 551. AT&T suggested that this "could be achieved in conjunction
with one-way mass announcement services by connecting interactive access lines to each... mass
distributuion center." Id.
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